Significance: In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when accused of a crime included the right to remain silent.
Background: Danny Escobedo, a murder suspect, was arrested and taken to a police station for questioning. He repeatedly asked for his lawyer and his lawyer, who had arrived at the police station, repeatedly asked to see his client. However, the police prevented them from meeting. The police also did not advise Escobedo of his right to remain silent. During the questioning, Escobedo confessed to the murder. His confession was used at the trial and Escobedo was convicted. He appealed his conviction.
Decision: This case was argued on April 29, 1964, and decided on June 22, 1964, by a vote of 5 to 4. The majority decided for Escobedo and threw out his confession. Justice Arthur Goldberg spoke for the Court. Goldberg argued that when the process shifts from “investigatory” to “accusatory”—meaning that “the focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession”—that the accused must be permitted to consult with a lawyer and must be advised of his or her right to remain silent. The ruling, however, caused much confusion and some law enforcement personnel feared that it would limit their right to interrogate suspects. The case of Miranda v. Arizona, decided in 1966, more clearly defined the rights of the accused and lessened the significance of Escobedo.
Excerpt from the Opinion of the Court: “We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the ‘confession’ will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation. . . ."
“We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart [limit] the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that system.”
